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The purpose of this paper is to propose an extension to Lee Smolin’s
hypothesis that our own universe belongs to a population of universes
which have evolved by natural selection. Smolin’s hypothesis explains why
the parameters of physics possess the values we observe them to possess,
but depends upon the contingent fact that the universe is a quantum
relativistic universe. It is proposed that the prior existence of a quantum
relativistic universe can itself be explained by the notion of evolution
towards stable (‘rigid’) mathematical structures.
1 Introduction
According to current mathematical physics, there are many aspects of our phys-
ical universe which are contingent rather than necessary. These include such
things as the values of the numerous free parameters in the standard model of
particle physics, and the parameters which specify the initial conditions in gen-
eral relativistic models of the universe. The values of these parameters cannot
be theoretically derived, and need to be determined by experiment and observa-
tion. Study has revealed that the existence of life is very sensitively dependent
upon the values of these parameters (Barrow and Tipler 1986). If a universe had
values for these parameters only slightly different from the values they possess
in our own universe, then that universe would be incapable of supporting life.
Hence, people have sought to explain why a life-supporting universe exists.
In fact, the problem posed by the contingent values of the free parameters
can be generalised. If our physical universe is conceived to be an instance of a
mathematical structure, (i.e., a structured set), then it is natural to ask why this
mathematical structure physically exists and not some other. The mathematical
structure which our universe physically instantiates is contingent, and requires
some explanation.
The problem posed by the free parameters of the standard model is a special
case of this because the values chosen for those parameters correspond to a choice
of structure at various points in the theory. For example, the coupling constants
of the strong and electromagnetic forces, the Weinberg angle, the masses of
the elementary quarks and leptons, and the values of the four parameters in
the Cabibbo-Kobayashi-Maskawa matrix, (which specifies the ‘mixing’ of the
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{d, s, b} quark flavours in weak force interactions), all correspond to a choice
of mathematical structure. The values chosen for the coupling constants of a
gauge field with gauge group G correspond to a choice of metric in the Lie
algebra g (Derdzinksi 1992, p114-115); the Weinberg angle corresponds to a
choice of metric in the Lie algebra of the electroweak force (ibid., p104-111),
and, in combination with the electromagnetic coupling constant, determines
the electroweak coupling constants; the values chosen for the masses of the
elementary quarks and leptons correspond to the choice of a finite family of
irreducible unitary representations of the local space-time symmetry group, from
a continuous infinity of alternatives on offer; and the choice of a specific Cabibbo-
Kobayashi-Maskawa matrix corresponds to the selection of a specific orthogonal
decomposition σd′⊕σs′⊕σb′ of the fibre bundle which represents a generalisation
of the {d, s, b} quark flavours (ibid., p160).
One response to this problem of contingency is to postulate the existence of
a collection of universes, which realise numerous different mathematical struc-
tures, and numerous different values for the parameters of physics. It is common
these days to refer to such a collection as a ‘multiverse’. Multiverses can be dis-
tinguished by whether or not some physical process is suggested to account
for their existence. For example, Linde’s chaotic inflation theory (1983a and
1983b), and Smolin’s theory of cosmological natural selection (1997), both pro-
pose physical processes that yield collections of universes or universe-domains.
Other multiverse proposals postulate universes which are mutually disjoint, and
which are either not the outcome of a common process, or not the outcome of
any process at all.
As Tegmark points out, all such proposals which suggest that “some subset
of all mathematical structures. . . is endowed with. . . physical existence,” (1998,
p1), fail to explain why some particular collection of mathematical structures is
endowed with physical existence rather than another. Tegmark’s own response
is to suggest that all mathematical structures have physical existence. The
weak anthropic principle similarly postulates the existence of a collection of
universes which is sufficiently large and varied that the conditions which permit
the existence of life will be realised in at least some of the universes. Both
types of proposal accept that a life-permitting universe is a highly atypical
member of the universe collection, and both types of proposal are difficult, if not
impossible, to empirically test. Alternatively, Smolin’s proposal of cosmological
natural selection explains the existence of our life-supporting universe, renders
such universes highly typical, and is subject to empirical test. We now proceed
to expound Smolin’s hypothesis.
2 Cosmological natural selection
To understand Smolin’s idea, it is first useful to appreciate that the conditions
for natural selection to occur can be precisely defined, in complete abstraction
from any particular physical instance. If a collection of objects satisfies these
conditions, then that collection will, with overwhelming likelihood, evolve by
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natural selection, irrespective of what those objects are. Darwinian biological
evolution by natural selection, is just one particular case.
John Barrow asserts that natural selection (or, as he calls it, ‘Darwinian
evolution’), “has just three requirements:
• The existence of variations among the members of a population. These
can be in structure, in function, or in behaviour.
• The likelihood of survival, or of reproduction, depends upon those varia-
tions.
• A means of inheriting characteristics must exist, so that there is some
correlation between the nature of parents and their offspring. Those vari-
ations that contribute to the likelihood of the parents’ survival will thus
most probably be inherited.
It should be stressed that under these conditions evolution is not an option.
If any population has these properties then it must evolve,” (Barrow 1995, p21).
Smolin hypothesises that there exists a population1 of universes, and that
the values of the free parameters in the standard model of particle physics are
variable characteristics of the universes in the population. For simplicity, let
us accept that the values of the fundamental parameters of physics are fixed in
each universe, but can vary from one universe to another.
Smolin hypothesises that certain types of universe in the population are
reproductively active. He suggests that in those universes where black holes
form, a child universe is created inside the event horizon of the black hole.
Specifically, Smolin’s proposal is that “quantum effects prevent the formation
of singularities, at which time starts or stops. If this is true, then time does not
end in the centers of black holes, but continues into some new region of space-
time. . . Going back towards the alleged first moment of our universe, we find
also that our Big Bang could just be the result of such a bounce in a black hole
that formed in some other region of space and time. Presumably, whether this
postulate corresponds to reality depends on the details of the quantum theory
of gravity. Unfortunately, that theory is not yet complete enough to help us
decide the issue,” (1997, p93).
In the decade since Smolin proposed his idea, loop quantum gravity has
made some significant progress, and its application to cosmology now appears
to support Smolin’s hypothesis. For example, in a recent review, Ashtekar
asserts that “In the distant past, the [quantum] state is peaked on a classical,
contracting pre-big-bang branch which closely follows the evolution dictated by
Friedmann equations. But when the matter density reaches the Planck regime,
quantum geometry effects become significant. Interestingly, they make gravity
repulsive, not only halting the collapse but turning it around; the quantum state
is again peaked on the classical solution now representing the post-big-bang,
expanding universe,” (2006, p12)
1Hereafter, I shall refer to a collection of universes which are related in some way as a
‘population’ of universes.
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Smolin postulates that the reproduction which takes place is reproduction
with inheritance. He assumes that “the basic forms of the laws don’t change
during the bounce, so that the standard model of particle physics describes
the world both before and after the bounce. However, I will assume that the
parameters of the standard model do change during the bounce,” (1997, p94).
Smolin postulates that a child universe inherits almost the same values for the
parameters of physics as those possessed by its parent. He postulates that the
reproduction is not perfect, that small random changes take place in the values
of the parameters. Hence, Smolin postulates reproduction with inheritance and
mutation. As Shimony puts it, “the variable entities are universes, and the
theatre in which the variation occurs is governed by the principles of quantum
gravity (as yet not fully constructed) and the form of the standard model,”
(1999, p217). Smolin’s scenario cannot explain why our universe is relativistic
rather than non-relativistic, and it cannot explain why our universe is a quan-
tum universe rather than a classical universe, because the occurrence of black
holes requires a relativistic universe, and the occurrence of a ‘bounce’ inside the
horizon of a black hole requires a quantum universe.
The number of black holes in a universe is determined by the parameters of
physics, hence the values of the parameters in a universe determine the number
of children born to that universe. If Smolin’s postulate that child universes are
created inside black holes with small random parameter mutations is indeed
correct, then a population that contains some black hole producing universes,
will probably evolve by natural selection. In particular, a population with an
exhaustive, initially uniform distribution of parameter value combinations, will
come to be dominated by universes that maximise the production of black holes.
In addition to the hypothesis that there is a population of universes evolving
by natural selection, Smolin suggests that the parameter values which maximise
black hole production, and therefore child universe birthrate, are also the values
which permit the existence of life. If the universe types with the highest birthrate
are also those universes which permit life, then universes which permit life will
come to dominate the population of universes.
The hypothesis that there is a population of universes evolving by natural
selection is distinct from the hypothesis that the parameter values which max-
imise black hole production are the same parameter values which permit life.
One hypothesis could be true, and the other false. Only if both are true will
life-permitting universes come to dominate the population of universes. If child
universes were created inside black holes with small random parameter varia-
tions, but the parameter values which maximise black hole production were not
the same parameter values which permit life, then there would be a population
of universes which evolves by natural selection, but in which life-permitting
universes do not come to dominate the population.
A weak anthropic principle explanation that imagines a collection of unre-
lated universes, rather than a population of universes evolving by natural selec-
tion, holds that life-permitting universes are special members of the collection.
In contrast, Smolin’s dual proposal that (i) there is a population of universes
evolving by natural selection, and that (ii) the parameter values which maximise
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black hole production are the same parameter values which permit life, holds
that life-permitting universes are typical members of the collection. In terms of
carbon and organic elements, for example, the theory of cosmological natural
selection “predicts that our universe has these ingredients for life, not because
life is special, but because they are typical of universes found in the collection,”
(Smolin 1997, p204).
Smolin’s hypothesis depends upon the assumption that there is a quantum
relativistic universe at the outset. One can ask for an explanation of why there
should be such a universe, rather than a universe in which, say, Newtonian
gravity governs the large-scale structure of space-time, or in which classical
mechanics and classical field theories govern the behaviour of any particles and
fields which exist. The existence of a quantum relativistic universe seems to
be contingent rather than necessary. There is, therefore, a need to explain
the existence of a quantum relativistic universe. A proposal for just such an
explanation will be made in the next section.
3 Stable mathematical structures
As a first step to explaining the type of universe population postulated by
Smolin, I would like to entertain the following conjecture:
Conjecture 1 At some level, the structure of our physical universe is a stable
mathematical structure.
A stable (‘rigid’) mathematical structure is a structure for which any defor-
mation, in some specified class of deformations, merely leads to an isomorphic
structure (see Mazur 2004). A deformation is a continuous variation of a struc-
ture by means of some parameter(s). Intriguingly, some of the most fundamen-
tal structures which describe our universe are, indeed, stable structures (Vilela
Mendes 1994). Firstly, whilst the Lie algebra of the inhomogeneous Galilei
group, the local symmetry group of Galilean relativity, is an unstable structure,
it deforms into a family of Lie algebras, parameterised by the speed of light c,
all of which are mutually isomorphic to the Lorentz group, the local space-time
symmetry group of general relativity. Secondly, whilst the Lie algebra defined
by the Poisson bracket on the space of observables in a classical physical theory
is an unstable Lie algebra, it deforms into a family of Lie algebras, parame-
terised by Planck’s constant2 ~, all of which are mutually isomorphic to the Lie
algebra defined by the commutator on the space of observables in the corre-
sponding quantum theory. If one thinks of each value of ~ as defining a different
quantum theory, then this amounts to the deformation of a classical theory into
a family of quantum theories. The same type of deformation can be performed
using C∗-algebras: “the classical algebra of observables is ‘glued’ to the family of
quantum algebras of observables in such a way that the classical theory literally
forms the boundary of the space containing the pertinent quantum theories (one
2Strictly, this is the ‘reduced’ Planck constant, ~ = h/2pi.
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for each value of ~ > 0),” (Landsman 2005, Section 4.3). At least some of the
parameters of physics are therefore the deformation parameters of mathematical
structures, and a relativistic quantum universe, such as our own, corresponds
in at least some respects to a stable structure.
There are also some suggestive facts from the standard model of particle
physics, where each gauge force field has an ‘internal’ symmetry group, called
the gauge group. A gauge group must be a compact, connected Lie Group. In
our universe, the gauge group of the electromagnetic force is U(1), the gauge
group of the electroweak force is U(2) ∼= SU(2)×U(1)/Z2, and the gauge group
of the strong force is SU(3). Now, the vanishing of the second cohomology
group of a Lie algebra entails that the Lie algebra is stable (see Vilela Mendes
1994). Semi-simple Lie algebras have a trivial second cohomology group, hence
semi-simple Lie algebras are stable structures. Every simple Lie algebra is semi-
simple, and SU(2) and SU(3) are simple Lie groups, hence the Lie algebras of
SU(2) and SU(3) are stable structures. Moreover, the Lie algebra of U(1) is R,
and, as the only 1-dimensional real Lie algebra, this is also a stable Lie algebra.
There are, however, many simple, compact, connected Lie groups. The list of
the simply connected ones alone, contains the special unitary groups SU(n), n ≥
2; the symplectic groups Sp(n), n ≥ 2; the spin groups Spin(2n + 1), n ≥ 3;
the spin groups Spin(2n), n ≥ 4; and the five exceptional Lie groups E6, E7,
E8, F4, and G2, (Simon 1996, p151). Hence, structural stability alone can only
go so far towards explaining why the gauge fields which exist in our universe
are those which have either U(1), U(2) ∼= SU(2) × U(1)/Z2, or SU(3) as their
gauge groups. The gauge fields which exist in our universe might have to be
explained by a combination of structural stability and additional constraints on
the permissable gauge fields.
To explain why our universe is, at some level, a stable mathematical struc-
ture, I would like to make the following proposal:
Conjecture 2 There is a physical process which randomly changes deformation
parameters such as c and ~.
Because c and ~ are parameters with dimensions, this makes it difficult
to unambiguously determine, by observation and measurement, whether these
parameters actually are subject to variation; the variation of dimensionless pa-
rameters is much easier to test (Barrow 2004). Nevertheless, the proposal above
constitutes a potentially testable conjecture, and is therefore a scientific con-
jecture. The existence of such a physical process will inevitably result in a
relativistic quantum universe, even if it started with a classical universe, or
a non-relativistic universe. Moreover, with the imposition perhaps of further
constraints, such a process might produce a universe with gauge fields like our
own, even if it started with quite different gauge fields. If so, then a quantum
relativistic universe with the gauge force fields we observe, would be a stable
region in the mathematical ‘landscape’.
However, such a conjecture only goes so far; the mathematical structures
which describe our universe can only be cast as stable structures at a quite
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general level. Whilst a quantum relativistic universe can be said to be a stable
structure, the specific structures of the particles and fields in such a universe
cannot. For example, recall that the values of the coupling constants of the
gauge fields correspond to the choice of particular metrics on the gauge group
Lie algebras, and the particular metrics chosen in our own universe are not
stable in any sense; different coupling constants correspond to non-isometric
structures on the gauge group Lie algebras.
To explain the more detailed mathematical structure of our universe, I would
therefore like to propose that we combine the notion of evolution towards stable
mathematical structures with Smolin’s scenario of cosmological evolution by
natural selection. I would like to propose that:
Conjecture 3 Our universe belongs to a population of quantum relativistic uni-
verses, evolving by natural selection.
To reiterate, Smolin’s scenario explains how parameters of the standard
model, such as the coupling constants of the gauge fields, come to possess the
values we observe. I propose that the evolution of universes which occurs within
Smolin’s scenario, takes place within a context established by the prior evolu-
tion of a stable mathematical structure, at a more general level than the level at
which the natural selection process operates. In fact, the evolution of universes
in Smolin’s scenario is dependent upon the prior evolution of a quantum rela-
tivistic structure. I propose that there are random processes which deformed
the structure of the universe, or a region thereof, into a quantum relativistic
universe, and from thereon, the processes postulated in Smolin’s evolution by
natural selection produced a multiverse of quantum relativistic universes, in
which the other mathematical structures we observe were able to evolve.
Of course, there are many different types of random process, so one objection
to my proposal is to ask which type of random process is taking place, perhaps
which stochastic differential equation the random process provides a solution
of, and to ask why this particular type of random process is taking place and
not some other. A stochastic process defined, for example, by a uniform prob-
ability distribution over the relevant random variables, is a very special type of
stochastic process. One could postulate different types of multiverse depend-
ing upon the type of random evolution in mathematical structure taking place.
This objection could also be made against the random variation of parameters
in Smolin’s scenario, but because Smolin’s scenario is placed within the context
of a quantum relativistic universe, he could suggest that the type of stochastic
evolution is determined by the rules of quantum gravity. Perhaps this is not a
problem at all; perhaps the point about stable structures is that any type of
random process will eventually take the parameter values into the stable region.
The type of the stochastic process will, however, determine the length of time
the parameter values are likely to dwell within the stable region.
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